Editors:

Andrei Marmor, editor-in-chief

James Dreier

Julia Driver

David Estlund

Articles

Volume I

Issue 1

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality

by Joseph Raz

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the...

April, 2005

"The Government Beguiled Me": The Entrapment Defense and the Problem of Private Entrapment

by Gideon Yaffe

Defendants who are being tried for accepting a temptation issued by the government sometimes employ the entrapment defense. Acquittal of some of...

April, 2005

Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency

by John Brunero

R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent...

April, 2005

Volume I

Issue 2

The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy

by Neil Levy

Accounts of moral responsibility can be divided into those that claim that attributability of an act, omission, or attitude to an agent is sufficient...

June, 2005

Essentially Comparative Concepts

by Jonathan Dancy

This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an ‘essentially comparative’ concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion...

June, 2005

Is Gibbard a Realist?

by Laura Schroeter and Francois Schroeter

In Thinking How to Live, Allan Gibbard claims that expressivists can vindicate realism about moral discourse. This paper argues that Gibbard’s...

August, 2005

Volume I

Issue 3

Cudworth and Normative Explanations

by Mark Schroeder

Moral theories usually aspire to be explanatory – to tell us why something is wrong, why it is good, or why you ought to do it. So it is worth...

October, 2005

First Force

by William A. Edmundson

The state’s very existence seems morally problematic: there may be a justification, but there had better be. A vivid way of putting this is to say...

November, 2005

Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?

by Ulrike Heuer

The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question...

March, 2006

Volume II

Issue 1

Strict Liability and the Mitigation of Moral Luck

by Greg Keating

The general problem of moral luck—that responsibility is profoundly affected by factors beyond the control of the person held responsible—is often...

August, 2006

Egalitarian Justice and Innocent Choice

by Nir Eyal

In its standard formulation, luck-egalitarianism is false. Disadvantages that result from free choice to take a risk can constitute egalitarian...

January, 2007

A Unified Moral Terrain?

by Stephen Everson

In his book What We Owe to Each Other, Thomas Scanlon proposes what he calls a ‘contractualist’ explanation of what he describes as ‘a central part...

July, 2007

Volume II

Issue 2

Well-Being and Virtue

by Dan Haybron

Perfectionist views of well-being maintain that well-being ultimately consists, at least partly, in excellence or virtue. This paper argues that such...

August, 2007

Welfare, Achievement, and Self-Sacrifice

by Douglas W. Portmore

Many philosophers hold that the achievement of one's goals can contribute to one's welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that the...

September, 2007

'Simply in Virtue of Being Human': the Whos and Whys of Human Rights

by John Gardner

In this paper I raise some questions about the familiar claim, recently reiterated by James Griffin, that human rights are rights that humans have...

February, 2008

Volume II

Issue 3

Contractualism, Reciprocity, Compensation

by David Alm

I argue that it is not possible to give an adequate account, within a Scanlon-style contractualist moral theory of the moral duties to reciprocate...

March, 2008

Hume's Internalism Reconsidered

by Dale Dorsey

A standard reading of Hume on the nature of practical reasons holds that he is a normative internalist; that, for Hume, legitimate practical reasons...

August, 2008

Moral Principles Are Not Moral Laws

by Luke Robinson

What are moral principles? The assumption underlying much of the generalism–particularism debate in ethics is that they are (or would be) moral...

November, 2008

Volume III

Issue 1

Caring and the Boundary-Driven Structure of Practical Deliberation

by Jeffrey Seidman

When a reasonable agent deliberates about what to do, she entertains only a limited range of possible courses of action. A theory of practical...

November, 2008

Saving People and Flipping Coins

by Ben Bradley

Suppose you find yourself in a situation in which you can either save both A and B or save only C. A, B and C are relevantly similar – all are...

March, 2009

Three Millian Ways to Resolve Open Questions

by Andrew Cullison

Millianism is a thesis in philosophy of language that the meaning of a proper name is simply its referent. Millianism faces certain puzzles called...

April, 2009

Volume III

Issue 2

Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism

by Tristram McPherson

G. E. Moore famously argued against skepticism and idealism by appealing to their inconsistency with alleged certainties, like the existence of his...

June, 2009

In Defense of the Primacy of Virtues

by Jason Kawall

In this paper I respond to a set of basic objections often raised against those virtue theories in ethics which maintain that moral properties such...

August, 2009

Implanted Desires, Self-Formation, and Blame

by Matthew Talbert

Some theories of moral responsibility assert that whether a person is accountable for her behavior depends partly on facts about her personal...

August, 2009

Volume III

Issue 3

Preferentism and the Paradox of Desire

by Bradford Skow

The basic idea behind actualist preferentism is that getting what one wants makes one's life go better. A recent objection to preferentism is the...

September, 2009

A danger of definition: Polar predicates in moral theory

by Mark Alfano

In this paper, I use an example from the history of philosophy to show how independently defining each side of a pair of contrary predicates is apt...

September, 2009

What Is Wrong with Kamm's and Scanlon's Arguments Against Taurek

by Tyler Doggett

Abstract: In forced choices between lives, where one group is larger than the other, Taurek claims you can save the few. Kamm and Scanlon argue that...

October, 2009

Volume IV

Issue 1

Beyond History: The Ongoing Aspects of Autonomy

by Steven Weimer

Historical accounts of autonomy hold that the autonomy of pro-attitudes depends, at least in part, on the way in which they came about. ...

November, 2009

Rossian Minimalism

by Ned Markosian

The main question addressed in this paper is: What is the most promising ethical theory (specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for any...

December, 2009

Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement

by David Killoren

There is an ancient, yet still lively, debate in moral epistemology about the epistemic significance of disagreement. One of the important questions...

January, 2010

Volume IV

Issue 2

What Knowledge is Necessary for Virtue?

by Olivia Bailey

Critics contend that Aristotelianism demands too much of the virtuous person in the way of knowledge to be credible. This general charge is usually...

February, 2010

When Will Your Consequentialist Friend Abandon You for the Greater Good?

by Scott Woodcock

According to a well-known objection to consequentialism, the answer to the preceding question is alarmingly straightforward: your consequentialist...

February, 2010

ISSN 1559-3061
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