http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/issue/feed Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 2021-08-13T20:05:46+00:00 Rachel Keith editor@jesp.org Open Journal Systems <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1430 Differentiating Disobedients 2020-09-12T16:41:19+00:00 Chong-Ming Lim cmlim@stanford.edu <p>Conscientious disobedients often face the demand to differentiate themselves from criminals whose law-breaking actions are not undergirded by conscientious convictions. In public and philosophical discourse, conscientious disobedients are often criticised on the basis that their actions render them no different from criminals. I provide a qualified defence of disobedients in this essay. I argue that the differentiation demand can be satisfied even by disobedients who engage in what are typically regarded as radical acts of disobedience. In practical terms, this means that even disobedients who engage in actions such as arson, looting, rioting, vandalism or vigilantism can also successfully differentiate themselves from criminals.</p> 2021-08-13T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Chong-Ming Lim http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1170 Scope Restrictions, National Partiality, and War 2020-09-13T10:25:18+00:00 Jeremy Davis jeremy.davis.816@gmail.com <p>Most of us believe that partiality applies in a broad range of relationships. One relationship on which there is much disagreement is co-nationality. Some writers argue that co-national partiality is not justified in certain cases, like killing in war, since killing in defense of co-nationals is intuitively impermissible in other contexts. I argue that this approach overlooks an important structural feature of partiality—namely, that its scope is sometimes restricted. In this essay, I show how some relationships that generate reasons of partiality are restricted in scope—that is, they generate reasons within particular contexts or with respect to particular goods. I then argue that co-national partiality is scope restricted. I then show how this fact helps proponents of co-national partiality overcome the aforementioned objection to its application in cases like war.</p> 2021-08-13T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Jeremy Davis http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1405 Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility 2020-08-02T21:12:09+00:00 Martin Montminy montminy@ou.edu <p>I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action <em>A</em> freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing <em>A</em>. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.</p> 2021-08-17T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Martin Montminy http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1148 Kant and the Problem of Unequal Enforcement of Law 2020-07-25T12:57:38+00:00 Daniel Koltonski dkoltons@udel.edu <p>According to Kant’s assurance argument, I am not bound in the state of nature to restrain myself from violating your rights, for I cannot be confident that you will similarly restrain yourself when it comes to my rights. Our status as equals requires that, if I am to be bound to respect your rights, I must have assurance that you will similarly respect mine, and this assurance is something that can only be provided by some entity whose coercive power over us is not only clearly dominant over us both but also directed at us equally. I argue that Kant’s assurance argument provides the basis for an important challenge to the American legal system’s claim to legitimate authority. This is, in one sense, a surprising result, since Kant is infamous for holding a particularly undemanding conception of legitimacy. I use the example of wage and hour laws: though the law define a worker’s wage rights, the legal system fails to enforce them against employers, thus leaving the worker without the assurance of the security of her rights that, on Kant’s assurance argument, she is entitled as a free and equal citizen.</p> 2021-08-13T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Daniel Koltonski http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1382 On Emad Atiq’s Inclusive Anti-positivism 2020-09-15T00:48:01+00:00 Kara Woodbury-Smith kara.m.woodbury-smith@durham.ac.uk <p>In this discussion of Emad Atiq's article "There are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-Positivism" I pose three challenges to his construction of an <em>Inclusive</em> Anti-positivism. I firstly argue that, contra Atiq, the moral facts that both ground IAP and allow it to satisfy the extensional challenge are sometimes reducible to social facts. In Section II, I briefly discuss internal- and external-to-practice appraisals of legal norms. Finally, in Section III, I touch upon the divergent explanations of legal normativity IAP and positivism offer.<span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span></p> 2021-08-13T00:00:00+00:00 Copyright (c) 2021 Kara Woodbury-Smith