Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Constitutivism without Normative Thresholds <p>Constitutivist accounts in metaethics explain the normative standards in a domain by appealing to the constitutive features of its members. The success of these accounts turns on whether they can explain the connection between normative standards and the nature of individuals they authoritatively govern. Many such explanations presuppose that any member of a norm-governed kind must minimally satisfy the norms governing its kind. I call this the Threshold Commitment, and argue that constitutivists should reject it. First, it requires constitutivists to restrict the scope of their explanatory ambitions, because it is not plausibly true of social kinds. Second, despite the frequent reliance on physical artifacts in constitutivists’ illustrations of the Threshold Commitment, it counter-intuitively entails that physical artifacts can cease to exist without being physically destroyed. Third, it misconstrues the normative force of authoritative norms on very defective kind-members because it locates this force not in the norm, but in the threat of non-existence. Fortunately, constitutivism can be decoupled from the Threshold Commitment, and I close by sketching a promising alternative account.</p> Kathryn Lindeman Copyright (c) 2017 Kathryn Lindeman 2017-10-02 2017-10-02 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.220 Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons? <p>Abstract here.</p> Daniel Wodak Copyright (c) 2017 Daniel Wodak 2017-11-06 2017-11-06 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.246 Immigration Policy and Identification Across Borders <p>According to the traditional state sovereignty view in the ethics of immigration literature, societies have a great deal of latitude in determining and implementing their immigration policies.&nbsp;This view is typically defended by appealing to the rights of members of societies, for instance to political self-determination. Opponents of the view have often criticized its partiality to members, arguing that nonmembers can also make stringent demands on societies to be admitted and given the same treatment in matters of immigration policy as other nonmembers.&nbsp;In this paper, I take a different approach to responding to the state sovereignty view.&nbsp;I argue that even if we grant the premise that the rights of members generally trump the rights of nonmembers in matters of immigration policy, societies are greatly constrained in setting their immigration policies by considerations of domestic justice. The considerations that I focus on involve relationships between members and nonmembers that hold due to a shared quality or set of qualities on the basis of which members identify with nonmembers. The argument appeals to premises and principles that defenders of the state sovereignty view are committed to but concludes that this view cannot serve as a satisfactory framework for the normative assessment of immigration policies.&nbsp;</p> Matthew Lindauer Copyright (c) 2017 Matthew Lindauer 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.248 Can We Intend the Past? <p>Abstract here.</p> Oded Na'aman Copyright (c) 2017 Oded Na'aman 2017-11-06 2017-11-06 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.268 Hybrid Non-Naturalism Does Not Meet the Supervenience Challenge <p>Abstract here.</p> David Faraci Copyright (c) 2017 David Faraci 2017-11-06 2017-11-06 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.279 Is Agent-Neutral Deontology Possible? <p>Abstract here.</p> Matthew Hammerton Copyright (c) 2017 Matthew Hammerton 2017-11-09 2017-11-09 12 3 10.26556/jesp.v12i3.267