Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Not Duties but Needs http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/483 <p>In the scholarly debate, refugeehood is often understood to arise from a special need for basic protection, i.e., for protection of basic needs and rights. However, the main definitions of refugeehood shift to duties when aiming to develop this view. Either, refugees are defined as all those individuals who can receive basic protection from the international community, and thus arguably ought to be protected, or refugees are defined as all those to whom a special form of protection, namely protection by admission is owed. The paper argues that either definition is incompatible with a commonsense desideratum on consistent and plausible criteria for refugeehood, since these definitions imply that refugeehood depends partly on the capacities of protecting states and on the needs of third parties. Instead, refugeehood is defined by the need for basic protection and by flight aiming to remedy this condition.</p> Susanne Mantel Copyright (c) 2019 Susanne Mantel https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2019-05-06 2019-05-06 15 2 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.483 New Shmagency Worries http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/573 <p>Constitutivism explains norms in terms of their being constitutive of agency, actions, or certain propositional attitudes. However, the shmagency objection says that if we can be shmagents – like agents, minus the norm-explaining features of agency – we can avoid the norms, so the explanation fails. This paper extends this objection, arguing that constitutivists about practical norms suffer from it despite their recent attempts to solve it. The standard response to the objection is that it is self-defeating for agents to become shmagents. I agree, but the response ignores the possibility of shmagents who consider whether to be agents while already standing outside agency. Another response says that we ought to be agents because agency is, in some sense, normatively valuable, and if so, we can explain norms in terms of this valuable form of agency. But then the norms that our constitutions are supposed to explain are underdetermined because it is unclear how much we ought to care about this value. I conclude that the shmagency objection has yet to be answered.</p> Olof Leffler Copyright (c) 2019 Olof Leffler https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2019-03-21 2019-03-21 15 2 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.573 The Case for Stance Dependent Reasons http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/517 <p>Abstract</p> <p>Many philosophers maintain that neither one’s reasons for action nor well-being are ever grounded in facts about what we desire or favor. Yet our reasons to eat a flavor of ice cream we like rather than one we do not seem an obvious counter-example. I argue that there is no getting around such examples and that therefore a fully stance independent account of the grounding of our reasons is implausible. At least in matters of mere taste our “stance” plays a normative role in grounding reasons.</p> David Sobel Copyright (c) 2019 David Sobel https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2019-03-04 2019-03-04 15 2 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.517 Asymmetrism and the Magnitudes of Welfare Benefits http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/644 <p>One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal – Asymmetrism – when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible answers to a different question: To what extent does a given satisfied desire benefit you?</p> Andrew T. Forcehimes Copyright (c) 2019 Andrew T. Forcehimes https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2019-05-06 2019-05-06 15 2 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.644 The Meaning of a Market and the Meaning of "Meaning" http://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/646 <p class="p1"><span class="s1">Are there any viable semiotic objections to commodification? A semiotic objection holds that even if there is no independent consequentialist or deontic objection to the marketing of a good—such as that it is exploitative or causes third party harm—there remains a problem with what is said by participating in that market.&nbsp;</span>Recent discussion of semiotic objections have suffered from a basic ambiguity in such talk. As Grice pointed out, there is a difference between saying that smoke on the horizon means fire, and saying that it means there will be war tomorrow. We could say that in the former case smoke <em>indicates</em> fire because of its causal connection with fire, while in the latter case smoke <em>expresses</em> a call to war because that is the non-natural meaning given to it by convention or by its place in a communicative practice. The recent defenses of semiotic objections presented by Anthony Booth, Jacob Sparks, and Mark Wells do not survive this distinction, as they either complain about non-semiotic facts that are indicated rather than expressed by markets, or they complain about semiotic features of markets, but these complaints inevitably collapse into weak consequentialist objections. But this result is not bad for anticommodificationists, as semiotic objections have dialectical disadvantages.</p> Julian D Jonker Copyright (c) 2019 Julian D Jonker https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2019-05-06 2019-05-06 15 2 10.26556/jesp.v15i2.646