Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Intelligibility and the Guise of the Good <p>According to the Guise of the Good, an agent only does for a reason what she sees as good. One of the main motivations for the view is its apparent ability to explain why action for a reason must be intelligible to its agent, for, on this view, an action is intelligible just in case it seems good.</p> <p>This motivation has come under criticism in recent years. Most notably, Kieran Setiya has argued that merely seeing one’s action as good does not suffice to make the action intelligible. In this paper, I show that this objection has bite only because the Guise of the Good’s theory of intelligibility has yet seen little sustained articulation. Properly understood, this theory holds that an action is intelligible to an agent only if it appears to them to possess some substantive evaluative property. I then argue that this response to the objection has a significant implication for contemporary Guise of the Good theories, for it shows that the currently ascendant version of the theory, the attitudinal theory, cannot avail itself of the intelligibility motivation.</p> Paul Boswell Copyright (c) 2017 Paul Boswell 2017-10-16 2017-10-16 13 1 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.225 Ethical Reductionism <p>Abstract here.</p> Neil Sinhababu Copyright (c) 2018 Neil Sinhababu 2018-01-03 2018-01-03 13 1 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.247 A View of Racism: 2016 and America’s Original Sin <p>Abstract here.</p> Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin Copyright (c) 2018 Benjamin Mitchell-Yellin 2018-01-03 2018-01-03 13 1 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.253 Does Contrary-Forming Predicate Negation Solve the Frege-Geach Problem? <p>Abstract here.</p> Robert Mabrito Copyright (c) 2018 Robert Mabrito 2018-01-03 2018-01-03 13 1 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.346 Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious? <p>Christos Kyriacou has recently proposed charging moral error theorists with intellectual vice. He does this in response to an objection that Ingram makes against the 'moral fixed points view' developed by Cuneo and Shafer-Landau. This brief paper shows that Kyriacou's proposed vice-charge fails to vindicate the moral fixed points view. I argue that any attempt to make an epistemic vice-charge against error theorists&nbsp;will face major obstacles, and that it is highly unlikely that such a charge could receive the evidential support that&nbsp;it would need in order to play the dialectical role that Kyriacou has in mind for it. I conclude that the moral fixed points view remains in serious trouble.&nbsp;</p> Stephen Ingram Copyright (c) 2018 Stephen Ingram 2018-01-18 2018-01-18 13 1 10.26556/jesp.v13i1.228