Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> en-US (Jesse Wilson) (Jesse Wilson) Sun, 07 Jun 2020 20:15:36 +0000 OJS 60 Sorting Out Solutions to the Now-What Problem <p>Moral error theorists face the so-called “now-what problem”: what should we do with our moral judgments from a prudential point of view if these judgments are uniformly false? On top of abolitionism and conservationism, which respectively advise us to get rid of our moral judgments and to keep them, three revisionary solutions have been proposed in the literature: expressivism (we should replace our moral judgments with conative attitudes), naturalism (we should replace our moral judgments with beliefs in non-moral facts), and fictionalism (we should replace our moral judgments with fictional attitudes). In this paper, I argue that expressivism and naturalism do not constitute genuine alternatives to abolitionism, of which they are in the end mere variants—and, even less conveniently, variants that are conform to the very spirit of abolitionism as formulated by its proponents. The main version of fictionalism, by contrast, provides us with a recommendation to which abolitionists cannot consistently subscribe. This leaves us with only one revisionary solution to the now-what problem.</p> François Jaquet Copyright (c) 2019 François Jaquet Fri, 13 Dec 2019 15:48:34 +0000 The Eligibility of Rule Utilitarianism <p>According to the eligibility theory of meaning, often attributed to David Lewis, the referent of a predicate is the property that best balances the twin constraints of charity (i.e. fit with our usage of the term) and eligibility, where eligibility is a function of metaphysical naturalness (i.e. how much of a natural kind the property is). This sort of metasemantics, which is motivated by its ability to resolve problems of indeterminacy and secure shared reference between disputing parties, can be somewhat friendly towards revisionary (i.e. counterintuitive) theories, since highly natural properties can act as “reference magnets,” securing our reference despite some mismatch with usage. In this paper, I apply these considerations to normative ethics and argue that the theory of rule utilitarianism achieves a high balance of charity and eligibility. I proceed by comparing rule utilitarianism to two of its well-known rivals, act utilitarianism and Rossian pluralism (a.k.a. “Commonsense Morality”). I show how the former achieves a high degree of eligibility but only at a significant cost of charity, while the latter does the opposite, fitting very nicely with our considered judgments but at the price of very low eligibility. Rule utilitarianism, on the other hand, strikes a good balance between these extremes; it assigns to our core moral term (‘moral permissibility’) a relatively natural property without doing too much damage to our moral convictions. Thus, rule utilitarianism should be regarded as a promising moral theory by any philosopher who takes seriously considerations of eligibility and naturalness.</p> David Mokriski Copyright (c) 2019 David Mokriski Fri, 13 Dec 2019 15:50:55 +0000 Counter the Counterstory <p>Abstract here.</p> Hilde Lindemann Copyright (c) 2019 Hilde Lindemann Fri, 13 Dec 2019 18:52:26 +0000 Counterstories, Stock Characters, and Varieties of Narrative Resistance <p>Abstract here.</p> Mark Lance Copyright (c) 2019 Mark Lance Fri, 13 Dec 2019 18:53:12 +0000 Ideological Absorption and Countertechniques <p>Abstract here.</p> Asta Copyright (c) 2019 Asta Fri, 13 Dec 2019 18:53:55 +0000 It's Complicated <p>Abstract here.</p> Marya Schechtman Copyright (c) 2019 Marya Schechtman Fri, 13 Dec 2019 18:54:42 +0000 Reply to Mark Lance, Ásta, and Marya Schechtman <p>Abstract here.</p> Hilde Lindemann Copyright (c) 2019 Hilde Lindemann Fri, 13 Dec 2019 18:55:29 +0000