DOXASTIC PARTIALITY AND THE PUZZLE OF ENTICING RIGHT ACTION

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Friends and family help. In fact, we think that they, in some sense, ought to help us. But does it follow from the fact that they ought to help that there is nothing suspect with us trying to entice them to help? Consider the following case:

Moving: Ronan and Anna are close friends. One evening when they are hanging out, Ronan receives a call from his landlord. His landlord tells him that they need to do an emergency fumigation of the apartment and that Ronan needs to move many of his belongings out of his apartment. Ronan tells Anna that he needs to move a bunch of his belongings immediately. Anna listens but does not immediately say anything. Ronan then utters, “I’ve done favors for you in the past. Now I ask that you do me a favor and help me move.”

There is something “off” about the way that Ronan requests Anna’s help. Notice that he tries to entice her to help by pointing out that he has helped her in the past. Notice further that because they are close friends, Anna seems to have a sufficient normative reason to help Ronan move—that is, a normative reason that is just as weighty as the reasons she has to do anything else and thus is weighty enough to justify Anna’s helping. We can also grant that Anna knows (or is in a position to know) this. Moreover, the fact that Ronan has done Anna plenty of favors either provides an additional reason for her to help or at least intensifies the strength of her reason to help him. Nonetheless, it seems odd for Ronan to appeal to this reason in order to entice Anna to help.

However, in many cases involving coworkers or acquaintances, there is nothing odd about appealing to the fact one has helped someone in the past in order to entice them to help. Consider the following case:

Shift: Ming and Nina are coworkers. One evening when they are at work, Ming receives a call from his landlord. His landlord tells him that they need to do an emergency fumigation of his apartment tomorrow and that Ming needs to move many of his belongings out of his apartment.
Ming tells Nina that he needs to move a bunch of his belongings tomorrow but that he is scheduled to work. Nina listens but does not immediately say anything. Ming knows that Nina is not scheduled to work tomorrow. He then utters, “I’ve covered your shift in the past. Now I ask that you do me a favor and cover my shift tomorrow.”

The fact that Ming has helped Nina in the past seems to provide her with a reason to help Ming in this case, or at least it intensifies the strength of the reason she has to help him. But it does not seem odd for him to appeal to the fact that he has helped her in order to entice her to help.

Perhaps the problem with Ronan’s attempt to entice his friend to help him move by mentioning that he has done favors for her is that it indicates that he is keeping track of favors, and intimates do not count favors. In particular, when intimates do each other favors or kindnesses, they do so unconditionally—that is, not on the condition that their intimate will reciprocate. But this cannot be the core of the problem. Consider the following case:

Campaign 1: Ville and Olivia are a married couple. Olivia wants to run for city council. She knows that she will need help campaigning, and she wants Ville to help manage her campaign. Ville knows that Olivia wants his help, but he has not offered it yet. Olivia says to Ville, “Please help me run my campaign. After all, it’s the prudent thing to do. It’ll look good on your résumé, and the experience will mean that you can ask for a higher salary in the future.”

There is something “off” about the way that Olivia requests Ville’s help. She tries to entice him to help her by pointing to a strong prudential reason for Ville to help her. And it is certainly true that the fact that helping her would make him a stronger candidate for certain jobs is a prudential reason for him to help. But appealing to that reason to entice her husband to help seems odd. Also, notice that Olivia says nothing about previous favors and so the oddness of her request and of Ronan’s does not seem to have to do with “counting favors” or failing to give unconditional help.

Note further that trying to entice strangers or acquaintances in the way that Olivia does is not odd at all. Consider the following case:

Campaign 2: Tom and Aisha are acquaintances. Tom wants to run for city council. He knows that Aisha, although she is somewhat inexperienced, has the potential to be a great campaign manager. Aisha knows that Tom wants her help, but she has not offered yet. Tom and Aisha have a meeting in which Tom says, “Please help me run my campaign. After all, it’s the prudent thing to do. It’ll look good on your résumé,
and the experience will mean that you can ask for a higher salary in the future.”

There does not seem to be anything strange about the way that Tom tries to entice Aisha to help him manage his campaign. But notice that he appeals to the same prudential reasons that Olivia appealed to when she requested that Ville help her manage her campaign.

It can also be odd to try to entice our intimates by appealing to moral reasons they have (e.g., telling a friend that she should come to visit me in the hospital because it is her moral duty) and even by giving them new reasons to help (e.g., imagine I am driving to dinner with a friend when my tire bursts, and then I offer him money to help me change it). Even if it is true that my friend has a moral duty to visit me in the hospital, it is seemingly problematic for me to try to entice him by explicitly mentioning this reason. And, even if I could give my friend an additional reason to help me change my tire by paying him money, it still seems troubling for me to try to entice him in this way.

All of these cases suggest the following thesis:

Problematic: Generally, it seems problematic to appeal to certain facts (e.g., previous favors and prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us even when those facts actually provide our intimates with sufficient reasons to perform those actions.

To be clear, Problematic is a claim about what is generally true. So, I am not claiming that it is always odd to appeal to facts about previous favors or prudentially relevant facts in order to entice our intimates to help us. For example, if one is asking a friend to risk their life (e.g., to save one in a fire), then there might be nothing seemingly odd about mentioning that one has risked one’s own life for one’s friend. In such cases, the duress one is under might excuse what one does, or the high stakes might make it so that one’s friend has a weaker normative reason to help, and thus, one’s request can either provide an additional reason to help or intensify the strength of the original normative reason.¹

Nonetheless, the fact that the above-mentioned ways of enticing our intimates to act even sometimes seem problematic is puzzling because all of the requested actions are actions that the requestees have sufficient normative reason to do regardless of the request. Moreover, it may even be the case that the reasons appealed to in Moving and Campaign 1 are decisive reasons for Anna and Ville to help—that is, they are reasons that are weightier than the reasons to do anything else. So why would it seem problematic to appeal to these reasons in order to entice our intimates to help?

¹ I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this qualification.
The above cases (Moving, Shift, Campaign 1, and Campaign 2) also suggest the following thesis:

\textit{Asymmetry:} Generally, it seems more problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts (e.g., about previous favors or prudentially relevant facts) in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us than it is to appeal to these facts in order to entice nonintimates to perform the same actions.

Asymmetry is also a claim about what is \textit{generally} true. So, Asymmetry is compatible with there being some cases in which it is just as seemingly problematic to appeal to certain kinds of facts in order to entice our intimates to do things that help us as it is to appeal to these facts in order to entice nonintimates to perform the same actions. In some cases, it will only seem problematic to entice intimates in this way. Other times, it will still be seemingly problematic to try to entice nonintimates to help one. For example, imagine that I hire an electrician to wire my new home, and he promises to come by on Tuesday to start the job. Now imagine that I call him on Monday not just to confirm with him, but rather I try to entice him by reminding him that I promised to pay him extra. If it is clear that I am trying to entice him because I did not believe him when he promised to start on Tuesday, then there is something odd about my trying to entice him.\footnote{I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this kind of case.} But it is still even more seemingly problematic if that electrician is my good friend or my sibling.

Asymmetry is also puzzling because, all else being equal, we are usually allowed to ask more from our friends and family than we are of coworkers and acquaintances. So why would it be more seemingly problematic to entice intimates to help than to entice coworkers and acquaintances in the same way?

Let us call the conjunction of Problematic and Asymmetry the \textit{puzzle of enticing right action}. Solving this puzzle is important because it concerns how we treat our nearest and dearest. If we mistreat or wrong them by appealing to certain kinds of reasons to entice them to help us, then it is important to know this. As we will see, solving this puzzle will show us not only what kind of enticements can be problematic but also what beliefs we should have concerning our intimates. Insofar as we care about our intimates, we should care about treating them well and thus avoiding making problematic enticements or having problematic beliefs about them.

Here is the plan. In section 1, I distinguish this puzzle from a similar puzzle recently proposed by Laskowski and Silver.\footnote{Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting.”} In section 2, I consider whether
Laskowski and Silver's proposal for solving their own puzzle works for the puzzling of enticing right action. I argue that it does not. On their view, enticing right action can seem problematic because the enticers are being disrespectful. In particular, they are disrespecting their intimates by expressing a lack of trust that the intimates will do what they know they are morally required to do.

In section 3, I provide my own solution to the puzzle of enticing right action. My explanation of Problematic is that the enticements indicate that the enticer violates a demand of good intimate relationships. In particular, the enticements indicate that the enticer violates a demand for a certain kind of doxastic partiality—that is, they should trust their intimates to follow what their intimates know is a demand of good intimate relationships when it comes to them. It is a demand of good intimate relationships that people be sufficiently motivated to act so as to protect or promote the needs, desires, interests, projects, and well-being of their intimates for their intimates’ own sakes. The above enticements strongly indicate that none of the enticers trusts their intimate to be sufficiently motivated to act in these ways, and so it looks like the enticers violate a demand of good intimate relationships. My explanation of Asymmetry is that while we are required to trust our intimates to be motivated in the way mentioned above, we are not required to trust strangers to have such motivations.

In section 4, I clarify my account by making certain background assumptions about normativity and responsibility explicit. In section 5, I further distinguish my account from Laskowski and Silver’s by showing how their view is committed to practical reasons for belief, but my view is not. In section 6, I briefly conclude.

1. Clarifying the Puzzle

The puzzle I am interested in concerns different ways that one might entice intimates to help one—that is, ways in which one can rationally persuade one’s intimate to do something for one. One way to do this is to request that they perform the relevant action. On the orthodox picture of requesting, when A requests that B φ, A gives B a new reason to φ. So, one attempts to rationally persuade someone to do something by giving them a new reason to do it. On a heterodox view of requesting from Laskowski and Silver, A’s request that B φ does not give B a new reason to φ, but rather points to an already-existing reason that B has to φ. So, one attempts to rationally persuade someone to do

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something by pointing to a reason that they already have to do it. A related way to entice intimates is to *explicitly* mention facts that provide them with reasons to do what you want them to do. In this paper, I focus on cases in which a person both requests an action and explicitly mentions facts that provide their intimates with sufficient (and perhaps even decisive) reason to perform the action.

Laskowski and Silver raise a similar puzzle in which it seems problematic to make certain requests of intimates. The puzzle they are interested in is related to, but narrower than, the one I am interested in. Showing just how the two puzzles differ will help clarify the puzzle I am interested in.

Consider the following case from Laskowski and Silver:

**Bar**: Stefan and Eva are old friends of means at their local bar, planning to tie one on as they usually do. Stefan happens to catch the attention of the bartender before Eva, so he orders the first round of drinks. Stefan then says to Eva, “I bought the first round—please buy the next one.”

Laskowski and Silver note that there is something “off” about Stefan’s request that Eva buy the next round. They note that Stefan has just done something generous for his friend, Eva, and that she knows that she has decisive normative reason to reciprocate. Moreover, Stefan knows that Eva knows that she has decisive normative reason to reciprocate. Importantly, for Laskowski and Silver, it is the request itself that is problematic. We can call the puzzle that Laskowski and Silver are interested in the puzzle of *requesting reciprocity*.

The puzzle of enticing right action is broader than the puzzle of requesting reciprocity in a few key ways. First, the former concerns not only making requests but also explicitly mentioning certain kinds of sufficient reasons for action (e.g., previous favors or prudentially relevant facts). In fact, I focus on explicitly mentioning these facts as opposed to merely making certain requests. Second, the former concerns not only enticing reciprocity but also enticing help that would not constitute reciprocity (e.g., as in Campaign 1). Third, the former concerns actions that one’s intimates have either sufficient or decisive reason to perform, but the latter only involves cases in which the intimates have decisive normative reason to perform the relevant action. In fact, the puzzle of requesting reciprocity can be seen as a specific instance of the more general puzzle of enticing right action. After all, requesting is a way of enticing, as I have defined it, and the reciprocity that Laskowski and Silver are interested in

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5 Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting.”
6 Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting,” 49.
7 Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting,” 56.
8 Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting,” 56.
is reciprocity that is morally right (i.e., permissible or required). So, my explanation of the puzzle of enticing right action can also be seen as an explanation of the puzzle of requesting reciprocity.

2. REQUESTS, TRUST, AND DISRESPECT

In this section, I consider a plausible solution to the puzzle of enticing right action from Laskowski and Silver and argue that this solution is ultimately unsatisfactory.

Laskowski and Silver argue that people have a special moral obligation to trust their intimates to do what their intimates know they are morally required to do.9 For ease of exposition, I will focus exclusively on the case Moving. Laskowski and Silver would likely point out that before Ronan makes his request and tries to entice Anna to help, Anna knows that she has decisive moral reason to help her friend move because he is her friend and it is an emergency. In addition, Ronan has helped her in the past. And Ronan knows that Anna knows that she has sufficient or decisive moral reason to help him move.

Laskowski and Silver’s explanation of the wrongness of Ronan’s enticing Anna to help is that it expresses a disrespectful belief—that is, the belief that the intimate will not do what they know they have decisive moral reason to do. The belief is especially disrespectful because it constitutes a failure to trust intimates to do what they know they morally ought to do. But, as they argue, we have a pro tanto moral obligation to trust intimates to do what they know they should.10 The above enticements are expressions of disrespectful beliefs and are therefore disrespectful. Thus, according to this explanation, the enticers wrong their intimates by expressing a disrespectful belief.

More formally, the argument goes:

1. The enticers believe that their respective intimates will not do what the intimates know they are morally required to do.
2. Believing that an intimate will fail to do what they know they are morally required to do constitutes failing to trust an intimate to do what they know they morally ought to do.
3. Therefore, the enticers fail to trust their intimates to do what they know they morally ought to do.
4. Failing to trust an intimate to do what they know they morally ought to do constitutes disrespecting them.
5. Therefore, the enticers disrespect their intimates (by not trusting them).

6. In making their respective enticements, the enticers express their belief that their intimates will not do what they are morally required to do.

7. If one expresses a disrespectful belief about a person, then one disrespects that person.

8. Therefore, in making their respective enticements, the enticers disrespect their respective intimates.

9. If one disrespects another person, then one wrongs her.

10. Therefore, in making their respective enticements, the enticers wrong their respective intimates.

Thus, Laskowski and Silver’s explanation of Problematic is that the enticements are troubling because they are morally wrong, and they are morally wrong because they are disrespectful.

Finally, they can explain Asymmetry by appealing to the fact that we only have a special obligation to trust our intimates to do what they know they morally ought to do. Because we lack this special obligation concerning nonintimates, our making similar requests of them is either not disrespectful or not as disrespectful.

The main problem with Laskowski and Silver’s view is that premise 4 of the argument is false. That is, I think the following claim is incorrect: failing to trust an intimate to do what they know they morally ought to do constitutes disrespecting them. Without even saying much about intimate relationships, we can point to numerous cases in which, for various reasons, someone does not disrespect their intimate by failing to trust them in this way. For example, consider Leopold and Loeb, Thelma and Louise, or Bonnie and Clyde. Their intimate relationships were forged and expressed through immoral behavior (e.g., burglary, robbing banks, and even murder). We can imagine that they knew what they were doing was wrong, but none of them trusted their partner to do what they each knew was the morally right thing—at least much of the time. In fact, they often trusted each other to do the opposite. But their failing to trust each other to do what they each knew was the morally right thing was not disrespectful at all.

Even setting these extreme examples aside, I think it is false that failing to trust an intimate to do what they know they morally ought to do constitutes disrespecting them. Whether or not we respect or disrespect our intimates depends on multiple factors. One factor is whether we treat our intimates in the way that they want or ask to be treated. In order to be a good friend, partner, spouse, sibling, child, parent, etc., we must listen to and respect the desires of

\[\text{\scriptsize For more on such cases, see Nehamas, “The Good of Friendship” and On Friendship.}\]
our intimates. Failing to do as our intimates ask is a way of disrespecting them. A friend might ask us to treat them objectively and not sugarcoat things. For example, they often want and request our honest and objective (as possible) opinion on their art, business plans, romantic interests, and other life choices.

Sometimes, they might request that we be objective with regard to the morality of their behavior. For example, consider the following:

**Addiction:** Ahmed and Jerome are close friends. Ahmed has been battling alcoholism. After months of treating his friends and family poorly, Ahmed reaches out to Jerome for help. He tells Jerome that he knows he has a problem and that he knows he is going to likely start drinking again instead of going home to spend time with his family, and he wants Jerome to help him stay on track. Ahmed tells Jerome that his desire to drink is strongest on his way home from work. One day, Ahmed texts Ahmed and tells him that his shift has ended, and he is headed home. Jerome does not trust Ahmed to go directly home.

Jerome fails to trust Ahmed to do what both of them know Ahmed morally ought to do (i.e., go home). However, Jerome’s belief is not disrespectful at all. In fact, it shows that he respects Ahmed’s request for help and that he respects Ahmed as the kind of being who can autonomously request help.

Another part of being a good friend is actually caring about and being responsive to what is objectively good for them, even if they do not explicitly ask us to. That is, we ought to be sensitive to what contributes to or detracts from their objective well-being. In these cases, we show respect by treating their well-being as being important. For example, even if Ahmed had not asked Jerome to not trust him and thus help him beat his addiction, Jerome might have already noticed Ahmed’s addiction and been disposed to not trust him. But this lack of trust is not based on a poor view of Ahmed but rather on Jerome’s concern for what is objectively best for his friend. Jerome wants to protect Ahmed from hurting himself, and the best way to do that is to cease trusting Ahmed to do what Ahmed knows is the right thing for him to do. So, it is hard to see how Jerome’s lack of trust could be disrespectful. If it is objectively

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12 For example, see Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger”; Ebels-Duggan, “Against Beneficence”; and Elder, “Why Bad People Can’t Be Good Friends.”


14 Arpaly and Brinkerhoff appeal to a structurally similar case to argue against the claim that part of being a good friend involves developing a disposition to overrate one’s friends (“Why Epistemic Partiality is Overrated,” 43).

15 Elder, “Why Bad People Can’t Be Good Friends”; and Brink, “Eudaimonism.”
best for his friend that he not trust him as a default, and he ceases trusting his 
friend out of genuine concern, then it seems like he can lack this default trust 
and still be a good friend. And so, there can be cases in which being a good 
intimate does not require trusting one’s intimate to do what they know they 
morally ought to do.

One might worry that these are special cases in which one has evidence 
from one’s intimate that they are likely to fail to do what they know they are 
morally required to do. In the first case, Ahmed explicitly tells Jerome that he 
is unlikely to do what he knows he is morally required to do. In the second case, 
Ahmed shows Jerome (via his behavior) that he is unlikely to do what he knows 
he is morally required to do. So, perhaps what we are required to do is have a 
kind of default trust in our intimates. That is, perhaps Laskowski and Silver have 
the following view in mind:

*Default Moral Trust:* When we have no evidence (from our experience 
with or testimony from our intimate) for or against the claim that our 
intimate will fail to do something they know they are morally required 
to do, we ought to believe that they will do what they know they are 
morally required to do.

The examples of Jerome and Ahmed and Bonnie and Clyde are not counter-
examples to this view because in both cases each intimate has evidence from their intimates that the intimate will not do what they know they are morally 
required to do.

However, I do not think this default trust view is quite right either. This is 
because there will be cases in which your intimate’s doing what they know to 
be the right thing will involve harming you or another one of their intimates. In 
such cases, I seriously doubt that you are always required to trust them to do 
the morally right thing. Consider the following case:

*Cheating:* Imagine that you have cheated on a test, and your best friend 
knows about it. Moreover, you did not have a good reason or excuse. You 
simply did not want to study and decided to look at another student’s 
answers. Imagine further that your school has an honor code that both 
you and your friend have promised to follow. Moreover, you have both 
promised to report anyone who has violated the honor code.

It looks like the right thing to do for your friend is to report you for cheating. It 
also looks like she knows that that is the right thing for her to do. But would it 
be disrespectful to fail to trust your friend to turn you in for cheating? I doubt 
it. In fact, if you believed that she would turn you in, *that* would be disrespect-
ful. This is because it is plausible that you should trust your friends (and other
intimates) to protect you or be loyal to you, even if it sometimes involves doing the wrong thing. As the saying goes, “A friend will help you move, but a good friend will help you move a body.” The fact that you should trust your friend to not turn you in is explained by the fact that being a good intimate requires one to trust one’s intimates to do what they know they are required by demands of good intimate relationships to do. This is because, as I just noted, protecting an intimate’s well-being or being loyal to them is a demand of good intimate relationships.

3. TRUST AND DEMANDS OF GOOD INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

I think Laskowski and Silver are correct that the requesters fail to trust their intimates in a way that they are required to trust them. However, I do not think that the problem with this failure of trust is a moral problem. Rather, I think the source of the problem is that Ronan and Olivia fail to meet a demand of good intimate relationships. A demand of good intimate relationships is a rule the violation of which constitutes failing to be a good friend, parent, spouse, sibling, etc. These demands are internal to intimate relationships in the way that there are demands of good chess playing, good novel writing, good hunting, etc.—that is, rules, the violation of which constitutes failing to do these things well.

More specifically, when I claim that something is a demand of good intimate relationships, I mean that one can justifiably be held accountable in particular ways if one violates one of these demands without an adequate excuse. That is, if one violates one of these demands (without an adequate excuse), then certain reactions are fitting. For example, if A violates a demand of good intimate relationships concerning her intimate B, it is fitting for B to (i) “take it

16 For more on the possible conflicts between the demands of good friendship and morality, see Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger”; and Koltonski, “A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body.”

17 Following Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, some have argued that true friendship is only possible between virtuous (or at least somewhat virtuous) people and that friendship involves mutual development of virtue (e.g., Sherman, “Aristotle on Friendship”; and Thomas, “Friendship”). This might seem to call into question whether the people in my example even count as true friends. However, I think the Aristotelian view presents an overly moralistic and unrealistic picture of friendship because it would exclude the relationships of Bonnie and Clyde, Thelma and Louise, and Leopold and Loeb as genuine friendships. For arguments that friendship does not require this kind of moral apprenticeship and can involve conflicts with morality, see Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger”; Nehamas, “The Good of Friendship” and *On Friendship*; and Koltonski, “A Good Friend Will Help You Move a Body.” I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that I make explicit that my picture of friendship might conflict with this classic view.

personally”—for example, by feeling hurt, let down, or disappointed; and (ii) seek an explanation, excuse, or apology. In addition, it is fitting for A to (i) feel regret or guilt and (ii) be motivated to offer an explanation or apology, or to make it up to B.

We can distinguish demands of good intimate relationships from constitutive demands of intimate relationships. Examples of the latter kind of violation include cheating, backstabbing, and other kinds of large betrayals. These kinds of violations threaten the intimate relationship itself. If A violates a constitutive demand of intimate relationships concerning B, then it is fitting for B to (i) “take it personally” by feeling rejected or hurt, (ii) feel resentment or contempt toward A, (iii) demand an explanation or apology, and (iv) be motivated to weaken or end her relationship with B. In addition, it is fitting for A to (i) feel regret or guilt and (ii) be motivated to offer an explanation or apology or to make it up to B.

3.1. Intimate Relationships and Trust

Good intimate relationships require trust. In particular, they require trusting one’s intimates to follow what they know (or are in a position to know) are demands of good intimate relationships. In other words, being a good intimate requires trusting our intimates to be good intimates to us—at least when they know (or are in a position to know) what being a good intimate consists in. When I claim that being a good intimate requires trusting our intimates to be good intimates to us, I mean that we are only required to trust them to be a good intimate to us, and so we are not required to trust them to be good intimates to their other intimates.

When I say that being a good intimate requires one to trust one’s intimate to follow what they know are demands of good intimate relationships, I mean the following: one should believe or be inclined to believe that one’s intimate is following or will follow what they know are demands of good intimate relationships even when (a) one has no evidence for or against the proposition that one’s intimate is following or will follow these demands, (b) one’s evidence for and against this proposition is equally weighty, and (c) one has decent (but nonconclusive) evidence that they have failed or will fail to satisfy these demands. However, one is not required to believe or be inclined to believe that they are following or will follow these demands when (a) they tell one that

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19 For a similar distinction, see Shoemaker, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability,” 621–22.
they are failing or will fail or (b) one has incontrovertible evidence that they are failing or will fail.\textsuperscript{20}

The idea that one must trust one’s intimates to follow what they know are demands of good intimate relationships meshes well with the current literature on doxastic (or epistemic) partiality. The broad idea here is that we are required by demands of good friendship to have doxastic states concerning our friends and their behavior that we are not required (by any normative domain) to have toward colleagues, associates, or strangers. For example, we are sometimes required by demands of good friendship to believe in ways that contravene epistemic demands (e.g., of apportioning one’s beliefs or credences to one’s evidence) when it comes to beliefs about our friends.\textsuperscript{21} However, when it comes to colleagues, associates, or strangers, we ought only to believe in accordance with the relevant epistemic demands.\textsuperscript{22}

Stroud gives the example of being told by a reliable testifier that one’s friend has mistreated someone by sleeping with them and then knowingly not returning any of their phone calls.\textsuperscript{23} She asks how a good friend ought to respond to this testimony. Roughly, she thinks that a good friend ought to stick up for their friends not only in their words but in their beliefs as well. Sticking up for one’s friends in this way involves exerting more energy than one would exert for a stranger (a) to question and scrutinize damning evidence—for example, by thinking about ways in which the testifier might be untrustworthy, and (b) to look for less damning interpretations of one’s evidence. Moreover, it involves giving more credence to these less damning interpretations. One will also try to fit the evidence into a pattern of behavior that is less damning for one’s friend. Or, if one cannot do that, one will see some less than stellar attribute of one’s friend as a less important part of that person such that one’s overall impression of them is not damaged.\textsuperscript{24}

While Stroud and other doxastic partialists have focused on sticking up for our friends when it comes to beliefs about their morality, I am focused solely on sticking up for our intimates when it comes to beliefs about whether they are being good intimates to us. Relatively, I am arguing that when it comes to one’s

\textsuperscript{20} For example, see Baker, “Trust and Rationality,” 3; Morton, “Partisanship,” 177; Keller, “Friendship and Belief,” 332–33; Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” 504–6; and Hazlett, \textit{A Luxury of the Understanding}, 93–95.

\textsuperscript{21} Keller, “Friendship and Belief”; Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship”; and Hazlett, \textit{A Luxury of the Understanding}.

\textsuperscript{22} Baker, “Trust and Rationality”; Morton, “Partisanship”; Keller, “Friendship and Belief”; Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality and Friendship”; and Hazlett, \textit{A Luxury of the Understanding}.

\textsuperscript{23} Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality and Friendship,” 504.

\textsuperscript{24} Stroud, “Epistemic Partiality in Friendship,” 504–9.
intimates only, one is required (by demands of good intimate relationships) to trust one’s intimates to follow what they know to be demands of good intimate relationships. However, one is not required to trust colleagues, associates, or strangers to treat one in the way a good intimate is required to. Moreover, one is not even required to trust colleagues, associates, or strangers to follow what they know to be demands of good intimate relationships when it comes to their intimates.

3.2. Intimate Relationships and Motivation

What is seemingly problematic about the enticements in the above cases is that the enticers fail to trust their intimates to follow what they know their intimates know (or are in a position to know) is a demand of good intimate relationships. What demand of good intimate relationships is this? It is the demand that one ought to be especially motivated to act so as to protect or promote the desires, interests, needs, projects, and well-being of one’s intimates for that intimate’s own sake.\(^{25}\) For the sake of brevity, I will hereafter just speak of protecting or promoting an intimate’s “well-being” for their own sake. Under normal circumstances, the fact that an action would help promote or protect one’s intimate’s well-being should be sufficient for motivating one to perform that action. For example, if my friend needs help moving, then I should be motivated to help them, and I should be more motivated to help them move than I am to help a colleague, associate, or stranger move. And I should be motivated to help my friend move for her sake and not because it will benefit me—that is, I should not be motivated by prudential considerations.

Moreover, as Cocking and Kennett argue, one’s motivation should not, at least sometimes, be “filtered” through one’s own evaluative standard (e.g., one’s own conception of morality or rationality, one’s subjective tastes or attitudes).\(^ {26}\) Elizabeth Bennet in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice makes a similar claim:

> A regard for [my friend] would often make one yield readily to a request, without waiting for arguments to reason one into it. . . . In general and ordinary cases of friendship, where one is desired by the other to change a resolution of no very great moment, should you think ill of the person for complying with the desire, without waiting to be argued into it?\(^ {27}\)

\(^{25}\) Stocker defends the view that people should perform certain actions (i.e., those concerning their friends) out of friendship (“The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories” and “Values and Purposes”).

\(^{26}\) Cocking and Kennett, “Friendship and Moral Danger,” 285.

\(^{27}\) Austen, Pride and Prejudice, 54–55.
In such cases, the mere fact that my intimate wants or has requested that I do something for them should be sufficient by itself to motivate me to do it.

Why think that it is a demand of intimate relationships that one be especially motivated to protect or promote the well-being of an intimate for that intimate's own sake? The answer is that having this disposition is partly constitutive of noninstrumentally valuing a person (i.e., valuing them for their own sake), and noninstrumentally valuing one's intimate is partly constitutive of being a good intimate.\(^{28}\) That is, you cannot be a good intimate to someone unless you noninstrumentally value them.\(^{29}\)

It is constitutive of valuing X that we are especially motivated to act so as to protect, preserve, or promote X. If I value my membership in some club or group, I will be especially motivated to act so as to ensure that I continue to be a member there—for example, by following the norms or rules of that club or group.\(^{30}\) If I value my vintage car, I will be especially motivated to act so as to ensure that it does not get scratched, dented, or stolen.\(^{31}\) Likewise, if I value a person, I will be especially motivated to act so as to protect or promote their well-being for that person's own sake. When a person noninstrumentally values something or someone, then one is motivated to act in these ways for the object's or person's own sake. And, given that noninstrumentally valuing a person is partly constitutive of being a good intimate to them, it follows that it is partly constitutive of being a good intimate that one is especially motivated to act so as to protect, conserve, and promote the well-being of one's intimates for that intimate's own sake (i.e., because it is them).

We can also look to cases to see that failing to be especially motivated to protect or promote the well-being of an intimate for their own sake makes one criticizable. Consider the following case from Stocker:

Suppose you are in a hospital, recovering from a long illness. You are very bored and restless and at loose ends when Smith comes in once again. You are now convinced more than ever that he is a fine fellow and a real friend—taking so much time to cheer you up, traveling all the way across town, and so on. You are so effusive with your praise and thanks that he protests that he always tries to do what he thinks is his duty, what

\(^{28}\) Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition*, esp. chs. 2 and 3.


\(^{31}\) Lord, “Justifying Partiality,” extends this account to valuing objects.
he thinks will be best. You at first think he is engaging in a polite form of self-deprecation, relieving the moral burden. But the more you two speak, the more clear it becomes that he was telling the literal truth: that it is not essentially because of you that he came to see you, not because you are friends, but because he thought it his duty, perhaps as a fellow Christian or Communist or whatever, or simply because he knows of no one more in need of cheering up and no one easier to cheer up.\textsuperscript{32}

Your friend is failing to be a good friend, because he failed to be sufficiently motivated to promote your well-being for \textit{your own sake}. He failed to visit you \textit{because it was you}. So, this case is further reason to think that good intimates are especially motivated to protect or promote the desires, interests, well-being, and so on of their intimate for that intimate’s own sake.

3.3. Failure to Trust

Why should we think that the enticers fail to trust their intimates in Moving and Campaign 1? Before answering this question, it is important to keep the following in mind: Anna knows that helping Ronan move will protect or promote his well-being (and Ronan knows that Anna knows this). Ville knows that helping Olivia with her campaign will protect or promote her well-being (and Olivia knows that Ville knows this). Given that Ronan and Olivia have this knowledge about their respective intimates, we can ask: What doxastic attitude did Ronan and Olivia have concerning whether their intimate would be sufficiently motivated to help?

It might have been that they each believed that their intimate would be sufficiently motivated. But then their enticements would have been irrational. After all, if they each knew or believed that their respective intimate would be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote their well-being, then it would have made little sense to make the enticements. After all, if Ronan and Olivia believed that their respective intimate was sufficiently motivated to protect or promote their well-being, then they would have believed (or been disposed to believe) that their friend would help. After all, enticements have the aim of persuading the addressees to perform certain actions. Thus, under normal circumstances, enticements are only used if the enticer is agnostic or skeptical that the addressee will act in a certain way. On this interpretation of Moving and Campaign 1, the enticers act irrationally in making their enticements. The fact that they act irrationally on this interpretation, I think, gives us reason to

\textsuperscript{32} Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories.”
rule this interpretation out as a good interpretation of what is happening in these cases. After all, it does not seem that the enticers are being irrational.

This leaves us with either interpreting the enticers as being agnostic or disbelieving that their intimates will be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote their well-being. In either case, the enticers are violating the aforementioned demand that one trust one’s intimates to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote the well-being of their intimates. Thus, on either interpretation, the enticers violate a demand of good intimate relationships.

Why, then, are their enticements troubling? They are troubling because they indicate or provide evidence that the enticers do not trust their intimates. This is distinct from Laskowski and Silver’s view. Recall that they think the enticements express a disrespectful belief, which, in turn, entails that the enticers actually have this belief. This is because when some action expresses a belief, that belief nondeviantly causes the action. My view is that the enticements only provide strong evidence that the enticer has a certain belief and, therefore, that the enticer does not trust their intimate. So, it is compatible with my view that the enticer does trust their intimate to be a good intimate but nonetheless provides their intimate with strong evidence that they do not trust them.

In addition, the fact that the enticer makes certain kinds of enticements indicates that their intimates act in a certain way—that is, provides evidence that they failed to trust their intimates by disbelieving that they would act in accordance with the demands of their relationships. This is because, as Cocking and Kennett and Austen’s character, Elizabeth Bennet, point out, people should be especially beholden or inclined to act in accordance with the well-being (i.e., interests and desires) of their intimates, and so merely informing or reminding one’s intimates of what one’s well-being consists in (e.g., informing or reminding them of one’s interests or desires) is normally enough to get one’s intimates to act in those ways. So, the fact that the enticers know that their intimates know what would protect or promote their well-being, and the enticers explicitly mention facts that have nothing to do with their well-being in order to entice their intimates, strongly indicates that they believe that their intimate will not be sufficiently motivated by their well-being.

If the enticers were merely agnostic about whether their intimates would be properly motivated by their well-being, they would have merely asked them if they were going to help. After all, if they were truly agonistic, they would be just

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33 I am assuming that the enticers are neurotypical. However, notice that even if A had a compulsion to try to entice their friend, B, to do something that A already believed B would do, it would be natural for A to apologize to B in advance. And it would also be natural for A to ask B for forgiveness in advance for her persistent requesting even though A trusted B. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.
as inclined to believe as to disbelieve that their intimates would be motivated by their well-being. Only if the enticers believed that their intimates were not going to be motivated by their well-being would it make sense for them to list reasons that are unrelated to their well-being.

So, my explanation of Problematic is this: the enticements in Moving and Campaign 1 seem problematic because they strongly indicate that the enticers are violating a demand of good intimate relationships—that is, the demand that they trust their intimates to be especially motivated to act so as to protect or promote their well-being for their own sake—at least when the intimates know (or are in a position to know) that this is a demand of good intimate relationships. My explanation of Asymmetry is this: while we are required by demands of good intimate relationships to trust our intimates to be especially motivated to protect or promote our well-being for our own sakes, we are not required (morally or otherwise) to trust nonintimates to have this motivation.

The explanation of the puzzle of enticing right action also explains why good intimates do not do each other favors only on the condition that the favor will be returned. The idea is simple: if we do favors only on the condition that our friends will return the favor, then we fail to be sufficiently motivated by their desires, needs, interests, projects, and well-being. That is, if their desires, needs, interests, projects, and well-being are truly sufficient, then, in many cases, one should not need any other considerations in order to be motivated to help. Of course, sometimes one needs more in the way of motivation because one’s actions, while helping intimates, will come at some cost to one. But the point is that, in general, conditional giving or helping will violate the aforementioned demand of good intimate relationships. Thus, the demand of good intimate relationships that I appeal to provides a rationale for the common idea that friends and family should not count favors or help only on the condition that the favors will be returned.

Finally, the demand that an intimate be especially motivated to act so as to protect or promote their well-being for their own sake is derived from the more fundamental demand that an intimate noninstrumentally value their intimates to a high degree. However, noninstrumentally valuing one’s intimate to a high degree involves a lot more than just being especially motivated to protect or promote that intimate’s well-being for their own sake. Thus, it is helpful to talk about the derivative demand that one be especially motivated to protect or promote an intimate’s well-being for their own sake in order to indicate precisely how an intimate might fail to be a good intimate.34

34 I thank an anonymous referee for prompting me to be clearer about the relationship between noninstrumentally valuing an intimate and the demand to be especially motivated to protect or promote our intimates’ desires, interests, well-being, etc.
4. CLARIFYING MY ACCOUNT

In this section, I clarify my account by making certain background assumptions explicit. First, my position does not require taking a side in the debate over whether our special duties to our intimates ultimately derive from moral duties. Reductionists think that all the duties we have to intimates reduce to moral duties, while nonreductionists deny this. Nonreductionists can admit that we do have moral duties toward our intimates in virtue of the features they share with other persons. So, for example, we all have moral duties to not kill, torture, or otherwise harm our intimates, and this is derived from the same moral duties that we have to refrain from treating nonintimates in these ways. However, nonreductionists insist that we have additional duties to our intimates in virtue of our special relationships with them, and these duties do not reduce to moral duties. I am inclined toward nonreductionism, but my explanation of Problematic and Asymmetry does require me to take a stand on this issue.

Second, my position assumes that the normative landscape is not “flat.” That is, I am assuming that there are different kinds of requirements, demands, and reasons (e.g., moral, prudential, epistemic). However, it might be the case that talk of “moral reasons” or “prudential reasons” is just talk. Fundamentally, there might just be flavorless requirements and flavorless reasons on which these requirements depend. If this is true, then, it might seem that my view is not very different from Laskowski and Silver’s view. For example, one might think that the difference would essentially be a disagreement about the source of the requirement to trust one’s friends.

Dialectically speaking, my assumption that there are different kinds of requirements seems perfectly above board. Not only do Laskowski and Silver seem to make the same assumption, but this seems to be the orthodox view of

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35 I intend this point to apply not only to duties, but also to obligations, demands, reasons, and so on.
36 Reductionists include Frankfurt (“On Caring”); McNaughton and Rawling (“Deontology”); and Hurka (“Love and Reasons”).
37 For defenses of nonreductionism, see Wallace, “Duties of Love”; and Brogaard, “Practical Identity and Duties of Love.”
38 Laskowski and Silver sometimes talk as if they think that normativity is flat in the aforementioned sense (e.g., “Wronging by Requesting,” 57 and 60). However, they make it clear that one has a moral obligation to trust one’s intimates and to not disrespect people (“Wronging by Requesting,” 57, 58, 59). Moreover, the content of that trust is that one’s intimates will do what they know is morally right or that they have the moral character to do what they know is morally right (“Wronging by Requesting,” 58).
normativity.\textsuperscript{39} In addition, I think something important is lost by flattening the normative landscape in the aforementioned sense. The reason is that different kinds of requirements seem to license different accountability practices.\textsuperscript{40} As I argued above, violating a demand of good friendship (without an adequate excuse) makes certain responses fitting. For example, it is fitting for one's friend to feel hurt or disappointed and to seek an explanation or apology and for one to feel guilt or regret and to be motivated to provide an explanation or apology. However, I do not think violating a moral requirement (without an adequate excuse) makes the same responses fitting. For example, it is fitting for people who are wronged to feel resentment and contempt and to demand an explanation or apology; and it is fitting for the wrongdoer to feel guilt or remorse. So, if there is this tight connection between requirements of different kinds and different accountability practices, it is essential to distinguish different flavors of normativity—or at least different flavors of requirements.

Third, my view does not require some form of doxastic voluntarism—that is, the claim that one's beliefs are under one's direct voluntary control and so one can change one's beliefs at will. Nor does Laskowski and Silver's view. Recall that Laskowski and Silver claim that one has a moral obligation to not believe that one's intimates will fail to do what they know they morally ought to do. Plausibly, they also think that we should not suspend judgment about the matter either because that would be disrespectful to them. That is, it would be disrespectful to an intimate to be unsettled about whether they will do what they know they morally ought to do. This suggests that they think that there is a moral obligation to have a certain belief. On the other hand, my view is that one is required by demands of good intimate relationships to have certain beliefs about one's intimates (or the disposition to have these beliefs). For example, one should believe that one's intimate will satisfy the demands of good intimate relationships.

Given that both of our views put requirements on belief, one might suspect that both of our explanations assume doxastic voluntarism. Doxastic voluntarism is quite controversial, and so it would count against both views if they assumed it. Fortunately, however, neither of our views requires a commitment to doxastic voluntarism. Rather, we both just need a view on which a person can be, in some sense, normatively responsible for their beliefs.\textsuperscript{41} Laskowski and

\textsuperscript{39} Laskowski and Silver, “Wronging by Requesting,” 50n3, 51, 54, 57, and 59.

\textsuperscript{40} Darwall agrees because he thinks that moral requirements are conceptually tied to particular accountability practices (“Taking Account of Character,” 20; “What Are Moral Reasons?” 5.)

\textsuperscript{41} I will continue to talk about “moral” responsibility, but what I have in mind is the kind of responsibility needed for appropriately assessing our cognitive and noncognitive attitudes.
Silver need a view on which a person can be morally responsible for their beliefs, and I need a view on which a person can be held accountable for violating a demand of good intimate relationship. I will use the expression “normatively responsible” to indicate the kind of responsibility that is required for both Laskowski and Silver’s and my view—which I will assume is roughly the same kind of responsibility. To say that someone is normatively responsible for φ (e.g., an action, belief, noncognitive attitude, character trait) is to claim that she is the fitting target of normative appraisal for φ.\footnote{However, this does not tell us what kind of normative appraisal is fitting (e.g., blame, praise, indifference).}

Fortunately, there are many views of moral responsibility that do not require the kind of voluntary control that we have over our actions, and we can just adopt any one of these views as a view of normative responsibility for beliefs.\footnote{For an overview of the kind of views of moral responsibility that do not require direct voluntary control, see Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes.” Such views include volitional views (e.g., Fischer and Tognazzini, “The Truth about Tracing”); endorsement views (e.g., Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” “Identification and Externality,” “Identification and Wholeheartedness”; and Locke and Frankfurt, “Three Concepts of Free Action”); rational relations views (e.g., Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes”); and hybrid views (McKenna, “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility”).}

So, if any of these (or related) views are correct, then neither Laskowski and Silver’s nor my own view require doxastic voluntarism.

5. Distinguishing the Accounts

In this section, I further distinguish my account from Laskowski and Silver’s.\footnote{I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to be clearer about how my account is related but different from Laskowski and Silver’s.}

First, recall that they argued that the enticements in Moving and Campaign 1 are disrespectful and are therefore morally wrong because they violate the pro tanto moral obligation to trust intimates to do what they know they have decisive reason to do. My account agrees with them that a core part of the problem has to do with failing to trust one’s intimates. However, the content of the trust is importantly different. While Laskowski and Silver think that one must trust one’s intimates to do what they know they have decisive moral reason to do, I am arguing that we must trust them to do what they know is required of them in order to be a good intimate. And, as we saw above, I think that demands of good intimate relationships need not be reduced to moral duties. So, the source of the requirement of trust is different. Second, my account holds that the content of the trust we are required to have is primarily about whether our intimate
will be especially motivated by facts about our well-being *qua* facts about our well-being and not *qua* morally relevant facts. That is, we are not required to trust our intimates to see facts about our well-being as *moral* reasons to help us but as *relationship-based* reasons to help us.

Finally, Laskowski and Silver’s view assumes the possibility of doxastic wronging. A doxastic wronging occurs when one person wrongs another in virtue of having a belief with a certain content and not because of any of the consequences of their holding that belief.\(^45\) Thus, on this view, one’s beliefs can wrong other people in the sense in which one’s actions can. Because of their commitment to doxastic wronging, Laskowski and Silver are committed to the view that there are practical reasons for belief—that is, that one can form or sustain a belief that \(p\) on the basis of a practical (i.e., moral) reason. In this section, I will explain why their view entails that there are moral reasons for belief, but mine does not. This difference matters not only for distinguishing the two views but also for revealing that their view, but not mine, entails a controversial thesis.

According to Laskowski and Silver, \(A\) has a *pro tanto* moral obligation to not believe that \(A\)’s intimate, \(B\), will fail to do what \(B\) knows \(B\) is morally required to do. This is because it would be especially disrespectful to \(B\), given \(A\) and \(B\)’s intimate relationship. It would also seem to be disrespectful for \(A\) to suspend judgment about whether \(B\) would do what \(B\) knows \(B\) is morally required to do. So, it seems like \(A\) has a moral obligation to not suspend judgment on the matter either. Therefore, it seems like \(A\) has a moral obligation to believe that \(B\) will do what \(B\) knows she is morally required to do. But, to have a moral obligation to have a certain belief concerning \(B\) is just to have a decisive moral reason to have a certain belief concerning \(B\). So, \(A\) has a decisive moral reason to have a certain belief concerning \(B\). So, there are moral reasons to have beliefs.\(^46\) Moral reasons are a kind of practical reason. So, there are practical reasons for belief. However, it is quite controversial whether there are practical reasons for belief.\(^47\)

My view, however, is not committed to practical reasons for belief. As I indicated above, all I mean in claiming that something is a demand of good intimate relationships is that if one violates one of these demands (without an adequate excuse), then certain reactions are fitting. For example, it is fitting

\(^{45}\) Basu and Schroeder, “Doxastic Wronging,” 181.

\(^{46}\) Basu and Schroeder also admit that if there is doxastic wronging, then there must be moral reasons for doxastic states (“Doxastic Wronging,” 190–94).

\(^{47}\) For arguments against the possibility of practical reasons for belief, see Shah, “How Truth Governs Belief” and “A New Argument for Evidentialism”; Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason” and “Controlling Attitudes”; and Schmidt, “On Believing Indirectly.”
for one’s intimate to feel hurt or disappointed and to seek an explanation or apology, and it is fitting for one to feel guilt or remorse.

However, this view is compatible with saying that one should try to do things to make oneself less likely to violate the demands of good intimate relationships. For example, one has a practical reason to try to become more trusting of one’s intimates. But that is different from saying that one has a practical reason to hold certain doxastic states. So, in claiming that it is a demand of good intimate relationships that one trust one’s intimate to be a good intimate on some occasion, I am not claiming that one has a practical reason to believe that they will be a good intimate on that occasion. Rather, one has a practical reason to try to get oneself to have this belief—if one does not already have it. If one has an adequate excuse for not having the belief—for example, one tried, but psychologically could not get oneself to have the belief—then one cannot be held accountable in the above-mentioned ways.

Why should we try to make ourselves more inclined to trust an intimate to be a good intimate to us? While I will not commit to any particular answer, there are a few plausible candidates. First, it might be that we should try to make ourselves more inclined to trust them because that is what being a good intimate requires. Second, it might be that we should try to make ourselves more inclined to trust them because they are our friend or our parent or our spouse, etc. That is, the answer might be that it is just part of having an intimate relationship with someone that we should try to make ourselves more trusting in the relevant way.

These explanations might seem insufficiently informative or deep. However, as I indicated above, I will not defend a particular view about the fundamental source of these special demands of good intimate relationships. It might be that there is a suite of special demands of good intimate relationships that do not reduce to a single, fundamental demand. This would be an analog of Rossian pluralism about moral duties. Alternatively, there might be one fundamental demand of good intimate relationships from which all other demands derive. This would be an analog of the monism about moral demands found in most normative ethical theories (e.g., Kantianism, consequentialism, and contractualism).

48 For a view on the fundamental source of these duties or demands, see Brogaard, “Practical Identities and Duties of Love.”
49 Ross, The Right and the Good.
6. CONCLUSION

My explanation of Problematic is that the enticements in Moving and Campaign 1 strongly indicate that the requesters violate a demand of good intimate relationships. In particular, the enticements indicate that the enticers fail to trust their intimate to satisfy what the intimates know is a demand of good intimate relationships—that is, to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote the desires, needs, interests, projects, and well-being of one’s intimate for that intimate’s own sake. My explanation of Asymmetry is that, regardless of whether we are morally required to trust nonintimates to do what they know is morally or prudentially right, the demand of intimate relationships that I mentioned (e.g., to be sufficiently motivated to protect or promote our well-being for our own sakes) only applies to our intimates.50

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