Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 The Demandingness of Virtue <p>How demanding is the virtuous life?&nbsp; Can virtue exist alongside hints of vice?&nbsp; Is it possible to be virtuous within a vicious society?&nbsp; A line of thinking running through Diogenes and the Stoics is that even a hint of corruption is inimical to virtue, that participating in a vicious society makes it impossible for a person to be virtuous.&nbsp; One response to this difficulty is to claim that virtue is a threshold concept, that context sets a threshold for what is considered virtuous.&nbsp; On this way of thinking, what counts as virtuous in one society may be more demanding than what passes for virtuous in another.&nbsp; This response seems plausible when considering that virtue-theoretic terms like `honest' are gradable adjectives.&nbsp; Many gradable adjectives, like `tall' and `expensive,' have contextual thresholds that shift depending on the situation, and so is tenable that virtue-theoretic adjectives might function with contextual thresholds as well.&nbsp;&nbsp; A major difficulty for this response, however, is that virtue terms are absolute gradable adjectives, a variety of gradable adjectives that do not require a contextual threshold.&nbsp; Absolute gradable adjectives instead draw their truth conditions from their maximal degree, suggesting that Diogenes and the Stoics were correct to think that virtue is incompatible with even a small degree of vice.</p> Robert Weston Siscoe Copyright (c) 2019 Robert Weston Siscoe 2019-12-13 2019-12-13 18 1 10.26556/jesp.v18i1.922 Disability as Inability <p>If we were to write down all those things that we ordinarily categorise as disabilities, the resulting list might appear to be extremely heterogeneous. What do disabilities have in common? In this paper I defend the view that disabilities should be understood as particular kinds of inability. I show how we should formulate this view, and in the process defend the view from various objections. For example, I show how the view can allow that common kinds of inability are not disabilities, can allow that minor kinds of inability are rightly not described as disabilities, and can allow that socially imposed inabilities need not be disabilities. In the second half of the paper, I show that this theory is superior to rival theories. I criticize the wellbeing theory of disability (Kahane and Savulescu 2009, Savulescu and Kahane 2011, Harris 2001) and conventionalist theories of disability (e.g. Barnes 2016). Finally, I show how the inability theory is consistent with the best versions of the social model of disability.</p> Alex Gregory Copyright (c) 2020 Alex Gregory 2020-01-02 2020-01-02 18 1 10.26556/jesp.v18i1.572 False Exemplars: Admiration and the Ethics of Public Monuments <p>Recently, a new generation of activists has reinvigorated the debate over the symbolic public landscape of Western democracies, and in particular, public representations of historical figures whose immoral actions and beliefs are connected to the ongoing oppression of minority groups. In this paper, I consider three proposals for what we ought to do about such representations: remove them from public view, leave them unmodified, or re-contextualize them in some way. Drawing on the work of philosophers and social psychologists, I argue that there are a number of compelling moral reasons not to leave them unmodified. I argue that the decision to make these representations inaccessible to the public or recontextualize them for public consumption must be decided on a case-by-case basis, balancing several moral and pragmatic factors. Finally, I argue that in many cases, weak forms of recontextualization that do not involve altering their institutional context may be an insufficient remedy to the moral problems raised by these representations. &nbsp;</p> <p>&nbsp;</p> Benjamin Cohen Rossi Copyright (c) 2020 Benjamin Cohen Rossi 2020-01-16 2020-01-16 18 1 10.26556/jesp.v18i1.696 Kidney Exchange and the Ethics of Giving <p>The best treatment for end-stage renal disease is the transplantation of a live donor kidney, but many people cannot donate to their loved ones because they are incompatible. Kidney exchange promises relief. Kidney exchange programmes use centralised procedures to match donors with recipients in a way that maximises the quantity and quality of transplants. However, the transplant laws in many countries render kidney exchange programmes impossible because of ethical concerns against these programmes or against kinds of kidney donations on which these programmes rely. I give two novel arguments for the implementation of kidney exchange programmes. The first is that they are instrumental in meeting a moral obligation, namely to donate effectively. The second is that they may increase the motivation for altruistic donations, because the donation of one kidney may trigger &gt;1 life savings. Moreover, ethical concerns are considered that are embodied in transplant laws preventing the implementation of kidney exchange, and it is argued that they can be overcome.</p> Philippe van Basshuysen Copyright (c) 2020 Philippe van Basshuysen 2020-01-16 2020-01-16 18 1 10.26556/jesp.v18i1.895 Addressed Blame and Hostility <p>Bagley (2017) sets out a dilemma for addressed blame, that is, blame addressed to its targets as an implicit demand for recognition. The dilemma arises when we ask whether offenders would actually appreciate this demand, via a sound deliberative route from their existing motivations. If they would, their offense reflects a deliberative mistake. If they wouldn't, addressing them is futile, and blame's emotional engagement seems unwarranted. Bagley wants to resolve the dilemma in such a way that addressed blame's distinctive elements of hostility and emotional engagement can be accounted for. I argue that Bagley's focus on the proleptic character of addressed blame helps to avoid the dilemma, but that Bagley has difficulties accounting for the element of hostility in addressed blame. I suggest that an alternative account of addressed blame (1) makes better sense of Bagley's paradigm example, (2) avoids Bagley's dilemma in the way Bagley's original solution does, because it preserves addressed blame's proleptic character, and (3) can account for addressed blame's elements of emotional engagement <em>and&nbsp;</em>hostility.&nbsp;.&nbsp;</p> Benjamin De Mesel Copyright (c) 2020 Benjamin De Mesel 2020-03-25 2020-03-25 18 1 10.26556/jesp.v18i1.750