Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp <p>The&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. &nbsp;The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest.</p> <p>The <em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em> aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and applies a correspondingly high editorial standard. &nbsp;But it is the view of the associate editors that this standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well-argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.</p> <p>While the&nbsp;<em>Journal of Ethics and&nbsp;Social Philosophy</em>&nbsp;will consider longer articles, in general the journal would prefer articles that do not exceed 15,000 words, and articles of all lengths will be evaluated in terms of what they accomplish in proportion to their length. Articles under 3k words should be submitted as discussion notes, which are reviewed and published separately from main articles. &nbsp;</p> USC School of Philosophy en-US Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1559-3061 Planning on a prior intention https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/850 <p>Intention plays a central role in coordinating action. It does so, it is commonly thought, by allowing one to plan further actions for the future on the basis of the belief that it will be executed. Doxasticists about intention (Harman, Velleman) conclude from this that accounting for this role of intention requires accepting the thesis that intention involves belief. Conativists about intention (Bratman, Brunero, Mele) reject that conclusion. I argue that Doxasticists are right in calling attention to the existence of a cognitive aspect to intention-based coordination, but that such an aspect is better understood in terms of the attitude of reliance than of belief. I also argue that an appeal to reliance affords Conativists with useful resources for explaining that aspect of intention-based coordination in a way that is compatible with their rejection of the thesis that intention involves belief.</p> Facundo Alonso Copyright (c) 2020 Facundo Alonso http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2020-03-25 2020-03-25 18 3 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.850 Risking Civilian Lives to Avoid Harm to Cultural Heritage? https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/1076 <p><span style="margin: 0px; line-height: 107%; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 10pt;">This paper investigates the circumstances under which it is morally permissible to impose non-negligible risks of serious harm (including lethal harm) on innocent civilians in order not to endanger tangible cultural heritage during armed conflict. Building on a previous account of the value of cultural heritage, it is argued that tangible cultural heritage is valuable because of how it contributes to valuable and meaningful human lives. Taking this account as the point of departure I examine the claim that commanders should be prepared to risk lives of innocent civilians in order to avoid harm to tangible cultural heritage. I argue that imposing high risks of serious harm on innocent civilians without their consent constitutes a wrong that can be justified only in order to avoid a greater evil. </span><span style="margin: 0px; line-height: 107%; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 10pt;">It is then argued that damage to cultural heritage sites rarely constitutes the greater evil when weighed against the imposition of non-consensual risks of serious harm on innocent civilians, especially when the risk is substantial. Still, imposing substantial risks might be morally permissible under the condition that they are consensually imposed, even if they are not the lesser evil. However, I argue that even if one has reason to suspect that there are civilians who might consent to at least some significant risks in order to avoid damage to their cultural heritage, it is not clear that commanders should take this into account when deciding what to do. Unless all of those who are at risk consent, the fact that some of those whose lives are at risk consent to the risk of being killed do not make it morally permissible to impose this risk on the group as a whole.</span></p> William Bülow Copyright (c) 2020 William Bülow http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2020-04-30 2020-04-30 18 3 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.1076 Skeptical Hypotheses and Moral Skepticism https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/614 <p>May (2013) argues that moral skepticism is less plausible than perceptual skepticism if it’s formulated using epistemic closure (hereafter <em>the implausibility thesis</em>). In this paper, I argue we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis. Moral skepticism can be formulated using closure if we combine moral nihilism with a properly formulated evolutionary scenario. Further, I argue that <em>pace </em>May, the phenomenon of ‘imaginative resistance’ isn’t an issue for the moral skeptic; she has an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon. Thus, we should be skeptical of the implausibility thesis.</p> Jimmy Alfonso Licon Copyright (c) 2020 Jimmy Alfonso Licon http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2020-04-30 2020-04-30 18 3 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.614 Doing and Allowing Harm to Refugees https://www.jesp.org/index.php/jesp/article/view/955 <p>Most theorists working on moral obligations to refugees conceive of western states as innocent bystanders with duties to aid refugees if they can do so at little cost to themselves. This paper challenges this dominant theoretical framing of global displacement by highlighting for the first time certain practices of western states in response to refugee flows such as border violence, detention, encampment and containment which may make us question whether states who engage in such practices are indeed innocent. This paper provides the first normative analysis of these practices by seeking to classify them as either doing or allowing harm and invoking the fundamental moral imperative central to core common moral commitments - not to harm innocent people - to suggest that certain western states are not merely failing to aid refugees and allowing harm to come to them, but are instead responding to their calls for aid by harming them.</p> Bradley Hillier-Smith Copyright (c) 2020 Bradley Hillier-Smith http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0 2020-06-13 2020-06-13 18 3 10.26556/jesp.v18i3.955